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Understanding Intimidation
John Murphy*
This article examines the gist, vitality and practical utility of the tort of intimidation and
identifies what count as unlawful threats and as actionable harm. While two versions of the tort
have been identified in the past – one involving two parties, one involving three – only the
former has survived the decision of the House of Lords in OBG v Allan. In the context
considering the tort’s practical usefulness, the article exposes as bogus the suggestion that two-
party intimidation offers nothing that is not already supplied under the law of contract via the
doctrines of anticipatory breach, duress and economic duress. The article concludes with two
radical suggestions. First, that two-party intimidation is not a specifically economic tort and
secondly, in view of this fact, it was a most inappropriate tool for the House of Lords to have
used in their resurrection of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy in Total Network SL v
Revenue and Customs Commissioners.
INTRODUCTION
The tort of intimidation is of very considerable vintage.1 Yet, so sparse were the
reported cases during the three centuries that followed its first application that, in
the landmark case of Rookes v Barnard (Rookes), one Court of Appeal judge
described it as an ‘obscure, unfamiliar and peculiar cause of action’.2 Certainly,
the tort had eluded anything approaching rigorous judicial analysis or exposition
for the best part of a century until the House of Lords had occasion to examine
it in depth in that self-same case.3 Little wonder, then, that one stand-out feature
of Rookes should have been that the defendant persisted throughout the litigation
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1 One early case, Gilbert v Stone (1641) Aleyn 35, concerned a group of 12 bandits who threatened
to kill the defendant if he did not help them to steal the claimant’s gelding. While the court
rejected the defendant’s plea – namely, that he was entitled to rely on a defence of duress in
relation to his trespassing upon the claimant’s land – it nonetheless accepted that, in respect of their
forcing him to do so, ‘the defendant hath remedy against those that compelled him’ (ibid). Garrett
v Taylor (1620) Cro Jac 567 was another early case in which a claimant quarryman was entitled
to sue a defendant who had threatened would-be purchasers of quarried stone with ‘mayhem’ if
they continued to buy from the claimant. A more doubtful antecedent, though one which is
regularly cited in this context, is Tarleton v M’Gawley (1793) Peake NP 270. In that case, there had
been an unlawful act, rather than an unlawful threat, on the part of the defendant. (He had fired
a ship’s canon at a canoe containing Cameroonian natives – and actually killed one person – in an
attempt to dissuade the natives from trading with a rival vessel also moored just off the coast.) The
distinction between unlawful threats and unlawful acts is, as I argue at length below, a vital one
if intimidation is to be understood properly.
2 Rookes v Barnard [1963] 1 QB 623, 694, per Pearson LJ.
3 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129. The case in which the tort had most rigorously been examined
prior to Rookes was Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1.
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in denying the very existence of any such tort.4 No doubt with this persistent
denial in mind, roughly contemporaneous academic commentary suggested that
‘in Rookes v Barnard, the House of Lords has invented a new extension of civil
liability’,5 and that the case involved ‘a bold instance of judicial lawmaking’.6
Leaving to one side the fact that these claims are hard to reconcile with earlier
decisions offering clear recognition of such a tort, a more accurate portrayal of
the outcome in Rookes would have reflected Lord Devlin’s insistence in that case
that ‘the tort can take one of two forms’:7 the first involving only two parties; the
second involving three.8 According to his Lordship, the first version of the tort
would be committed where A threatened B and thereby coerced B into acting
to his own detriment. By contrast, the second version would entail A threatening
B and thereby coercing B into acting in a way that causes loss to a third party
claimant, C. This depiction of the law – differentiating as it does between
instances of two- and three-party intimidation – came to be regarded as ortho-
doxy among jurists and judges alike in the decades immediately following
Rookes.9 It remained the accepted view of the law for a little over forty years.
Then, quite momentously, in OBG v Allan10 (OBG), Lord Hoffmann (who
delivered the leading judgment in that case) painted a very different picture of
the legal landscape; one which called into question the continued vitality of not
just one, but both versions of the tort. According to his Lordship, any case of
three-party intimidation ought henceforth to be seen as a mere example, or
subspecies, of a more general principle of liability. The more general principle he
had in mind was the so-called unlawful means tort which is engaged wherever
A uses unlawful means – whether they be threats or acts – against B with the
intention of thereby causing loss to C.11 On this account, intimidation would in
future count as no more than one among several possible forms of ‘unlawful
means’. Such an approach is appealing both in terms of its apparent logic and its
undoubted simplicity. Furthermore, in the absence these days of any sound
juridical reasons to treat three-party intimidation as a discrete cause of action,12
4 No less remarkable is the fact that, when he subsequently wrote a book about the case, the
claimant gave it the title ‘Conspiracy’: see D. Rookes, Conspiracy (London: Johnson Publications,
1966).
5 K. W. Wedderburn, ‘Intimidation and the Right to Strike’ (1964) 27 MLR 257, 257.
6 L. Hoffmann, ‘Rookes v Barnard’ (1965) 81 LQR 116, 116 (emphasis added).
7 Rookes v Barnard (1964) n 3 above, 1205.
8 In this there was nothing genuinely new, either. Two-party intimidation was clearly recognised
in Gilbert v Stone n 1 above; whereas the three-party version of the tort had its origins in Garrett
v Taylor n 1 above.
9 As to jurists, see, eg, J. D. Heydon, Economic Torts (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1978) 64; A.
Dugdale and M. Jones (eds), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 19th ed,
2006) 1154–1157; B. A. Hepple et al, Tort – Cases and Materials (London: Butterworths, 5th ed,
2000) 99. As to the judges, there were no reported cases during the years in question that cast the
slightest doubt on Lord Devlin’s taxonomy
10 [2008] 1 AC 1.
11 ibid at [6]–[7] and [47].
12 Such a view of three-party intimidation has not always been tenable. This is because, as the
decision in Rookes amply testifies, the specific tort of three-party intimidation was not one in
respect of which (unlike other economic torts) the defendants in that case would have been able
to claim immunity under the Trade Disputes Act 1906. However, now that Parliament has
plugged that gap in the web of statutory protection via the Trade Disputes Act 1965, there is no
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it seems altogether the best way to view such cases in the future. In other words,
following OBG, I would now accept that we ought to consider three-party
intimidation as having disappeared as a tort in its own right. It is better seen as
having been subsumed within the broader unlawful means tort (with the intimi-
dation of the intermediary counting merely as the requisite ‘unlawful means’).
But things did not stop there in OBG. Indeed, as noted, the continued
existence of two-party intimidation was also called into question in that case,
both implicitly and expressly. The implicit sidelining of two-party intimidation
can be gleaned from roughly the first third of Lord Hoffmann’s speech which
was devoted to what his Lordship called a ‘clearing of the ground’. In the course
of this ground-clearing, Lord Hoffmann was at pains to distil out of the various
confusing causes of action that had emerged during the twentieth century just
two broad kinds of economic tort. Indeed, it is fair to say that this part of his
speech is characterised by a repeated insistence that the ‘general economic torts’13
can be understood according to a relatively simple two-tort structure, rather than
as a miscellany of incoherent causes of action. Within this perceived structure,
the first cause of action recognised was the unlawful means tort. The second was
that of inducing breach of contract (which he distinguished from the former on
the basis that it amounted to a form of accessory liability). In both instances,
however, the commission of the relevant tort could only arise out of the
interactions of three parties. Two-party intimidation – requiring no intermediary
– is obviously different and cannot therefore be accommodated within the
reductive two-tort structure Lord Hoffmann set out.
Rather more explicit doubt was also cast upon the continued existence of this
tort. Both tantalisingly and cryptically his Lordship suggested that two-party
intimidation raised ‘altogether different issues’14 than those at play in the tort of
causing loss by unlawful means. At a minimum, so saying suggested a significant
juridical distinction between two-party intimidation, on the one hand, and the
two causes of action his Lordship was prepared to endorse, on the other.
Unfortunately, however, his complete failure to elaborate just what he perceived
those ‘altogether different issues’ to be left the vitality and essential elements of
two-party intimidation in a state of considerable obscurity.
Even so, the very fact that he suggested that a different set of considerations
were salient in cases of two-party intimidation naturally invited conjecture as to
what they might be. As such, a detailed examination of what various jurists have
perceived him to have had in mind when alluding to those ‘altogether different
issues’ will be offered in due course. At this stage, however, it suffices to note
that, despite the obvious effort that was made in OBG to restructure, rationalise
and thereby clarify the nature and scope of the various economic torts, their
Lordships left a cloud of uncertainty overhanging two-party intimidation.
longer any juridical basis on which to reject Lord Hoffmann’s portrayal of three-party intimidation
cases.
13 This term was coined by Hazel Carty. She uses it in order to distinguish the torts that feature in
this article from the ‘misrepresentation torts’ of deceit, passing off and malicious falsehood: see H.
Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 3.
14 OBG n 10 above at [61].
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Almost before the ink was dry on the speeches in OBG, the House of
Lords’ decision in Total Network SL v Revenue and Customs Commissioners15
(Total Network) compounded the problems surrounding two-party intimidation.
There, a differently constituted House of Lords not only breathed new life into
this tort, but also sought to use it as part of the platform upon which they felt able
to reconstruct the tort of unlawful means conspiracy (which action appeared also
to have been snuffed out by the decision in OBG).16 Against this background,
then, the present article aims to provide a thoroughgoing re-assessment of the
law on intimidation. It seeks to offer an interpretive account of the doctrinal
scope of the tort (by which I mean an account which paints the law in the most
intelligible way it can be painted, given the existing case law upon which we are
bound to draw),17 and to bring into sharper focus certain of its hitherto more
obscure elements.18 In order to achieve these goals, considerably more is required
than a simple exploration of what Lord Hoffmann may have had in mind when
he referred to the ‘altogether different issues’ that he considered salient in the
context of two-party intimidation. Accordingly, the analysis will proceed in four
stages.
In the next section, I shall examine closely two key touchstones of liability in
the tort of intimidation: namely, ‘unlawful threats’ and ‘actionable harm’. These,
I shall argue, bear heavily on the tort’s juridical distinctiveness. Indeed, I shall go
so far as to contend that, properly understood, the tort of intimidation has
nothing specifically to do with the infliction of economic harm, and that it is
therefore a mistake to consider it one of the general economic torts. In the
following section, my concern will be to expose an important element of
incoherence in Lord Hoffmann’s portrayal of the law on intimidation in OBG.
More precisely, I will seek to show that it was a mistake on his part to attempt
to sideline two-party intimidation in the way that he did, given that it is
impossible to treat three-party cases as mere instances of the general tort of
causing loss by unlawful means without first accepting the juridical vitality of
two-party intimidation.
In the fourth section, I shall examine closely the precise inter-relation
between two-party intimidation and the law of contract, for it seems to be the
generally held view among subsequent commentators that it was towards this
15 [2008] 1 AC 1174.
16 It was precisely because Lord Hoffmann had said of two-party intimidation that it raised ‘alto-
gether different issues’ than those pertinent to the OBG litigation that the House of Lords
considered themselves free to resuscitate the tort of unlawful means conspiracy (which they
believed also fitted a two-party framework) in Total Network SL v Revenue and Customs Commis-
sioners. See, ibid at [43]–[44], [99] and [124], per Lords Hope, Walker and Mance respectively.
17 For a fuller account of what an interpretive account entails, see A. Beever, Rediscovering the Law
of Negligence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 21–28.
18 For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps worth stressing the nature and limits of this endeavour. Thus,
while I am concerned with what a rigorous exploration and interpretation of the case law reveals,
I am not at pains to show how this branch of law could best be crafted. That would amount to
a prescriptive account. Nor do I pretend, or propose, to offer a fully worked-out conception of
autonomy when, in the next section of the article, I identify that to be the most persistently
adverted to, and plausible, gist of the tort. Since the courts have not done so, any attempt on my
part to do so would, once again, take me beyond interpretation and into the realm of prescription.
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relationship that Lord Hoffmann’s cryptic remark in OBG gestured. In this
context, I shall begin with the general matter of whether potential, concurrent
liability in tort and contract is as problematic as some writers suppose. Thereafter,
and more specifically, I shall consider the extent to which there is any genuine
difficulty engendered by the perceived overlap between two-party intimidation
on the one hand, and the particular contract doctrines of duress,19 economic
duress and anticipatory breach, on the other.
In the final section, I shall conclude that now that the three-party version of
the tort has been formally subsumed with the more general, unlawful means tort,
it is only two-party intimidation that remains vital as an independent cause of
action; but not as a tort specifically concerned with the protection of economic
interests. Instead, I shall suggest that, properly understood – that is, according to
what I consider to be the most defensible interpretation of the leading authorities
– it protects a basic human right, the value and compensability of which is firmly
recognised elsewhere within tort law, as well as in influential torts scholarship. In
the light of these claims, I shall suggest, finally, that it was wholly inappropriate
for the House of Lords to employ two-party intimidation in their resuscitation
of the tort of unlawful means conspiracy – conceived, as it was, as a genuinely
economic tort – in Total Network.20
TWO OPAQUE ELEMENTS
It is generally accepted that in order for an action for intimidation to succeed,
three things must be shown: intention to cause harm, an unlawful threat and
resulting harm. Somewhat regrettably, the meaning of intention in this context
is not entirely clear. But since the menu of possible interpretations seems fairly
limited,21 and since the meaning of intention is not a problem peculiar to the tort
19 The duress principle is apt to be invoked in many fields of law. As such, it is not, strictly speaking,
a discrete doctrine of contract law. However, in the interests of economy of expression – and
particularly when discussing it in the same breath as anticipatory breach and economic duress – I
will nonetheless refer to it as though it were a discrete contract law doctrine.
20 That unlawful means conspiracy was thus conceived by the House of Lords in Total Network
cannot be doubted. Lord Neuberger was explicitly of this view, declaring that ‘[u]nlawful means
conspiracy is one of the so-called economic torts’: n 15 above at [216]. LordWalker also implicitly
sympathised with this view given his commitment to working out the essential ingredients of
unlawful means conspiracy by reference to ‘the general principles to be derived from the older
cases in which the economic torts have been developed’: ibid at [89]. Of course, as McBride and
Bagshaw point out, there is no reason in logic why even this tort should be conceived of in terms
that limit its application to the protection of economic interests: see N. J. McBride and R.
Bagshaw, Tort Law (London: Pearson, 2012) 699 et seq. However, engagement with this matter
falls beyond the limited aspirations of this article.
21 The fact that the House of Lords relied heavily on the tort of two-party intimidation in
resurrecting the tort of unlawful means conspiracy in Total Network might be taken to suggest that
the two torts share a common notion of intention. That being the case, it becomes salient that, in
Total Network, their Lordships proffered three possible interpretations of intention. Lord Walker
said it had the same meaning as in the unlawful means tort (n 15 above at [100]); Lords Hope and
Mance favoured a test of ‘targeted harm’ (ibid at [44] and [120], respectively); Lord Neuberger
thought intention meant that ‘injury to the claimant is the direct, inevitable foreseeable result’ of
the conspirators’ acts (ibid at [244]). No doubt, in due course, the courts will settle on just one of
these.
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of intimidation, I will not address that matter here. Similarly, the fine-grained
distinctions that can be made between threats, on the one hand, and mere
warnings or advice, on the other, are of no present concern, either. These,
though somewhat complex, are matters that have been well enough worked out
in the case law to date. By contrast, however, two elements that are essential to
grasping this tort’s juridical distinctiveness are those of ‘unlawful threats’ and
‘actionable harm’. These must be elucidated before any of the somewhat bolder
claims I intend to make about this tort can be advanced.
Unlawful threats
Although it is trite to say that the tort of intimidation requires the defendant to
have made an unlawful threat, it is not quite so obvious just what such threats
consist of. Nonetheless, we can work towards an understanding of what is
involved by use of a hypothetical. Suppose a mother cajoled her child into action
by saying, ‘Tidy your bedroom this minute or else there will be no pocket
money for you this week!’ In such a case, we can be confident that no-one
would seriously think that the tort of intimidation has been committed. Prime
among various reasons for this confidence is the fact that the mother would be
perfectly entitled to withhold payment of the child’s weekly allowance. Since she
would not be acting unlawfully in withholding the money, it follows as a matter
of logic, according to the reasoning in Rookes v Barnard, that threatening to
withhold it would be something she would be entitled to do without risk of legal
sanction.22 As Lord Reid explained in that case:
[S]o long as the defendant only threatens to do what he has a legal right to do he is
on safe ground . . . but I agree with Lord Herschell that there is a chasm between
doing what you have a legal right to do and threatening to do what you have no legal
right to do.23
In light of this, we can conclude that the tort of intimidation requires a threat to
do something that one is not legally entitled to do. The reasoning would appear
to be as follows. The very fact that what I threaten to do would be an unlawful
act necessarily colours the threat that I make and gives it the capacity to be
treated as independently unlawful. Put otherwise, it is the fact that I am pro-
hibited by law from doing what I threaten to do that causes my words to cross
the line that separates lawful persuasion from unlawful coercion.24
Yet, this only takes us so far since the bare notion of ‘threatening to do what
you have no legal right to do’ fails to illuminate sufficiently the range of possible
threatened illegal acts that might count for these purposes. One might argue, for
22 In fact, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of logic, as explained at n 43 below.
23 Rookes v Barnard (1964) n 3 above, 1168. In similar vein, see Crofter v Veitch [1942] AC 435, 467,
per Lord Wright.
24 Note however that a mere threat to do something unlawful will not by itself suffice: the threat
must succeed in being coercive: Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd v SOGAT (’82) [1987] ICR 181, 204,
per Stuart-Smith LJ.
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example, that threats to commit crimes, torts and breaches of contract should all
qualify as unlawful threats on the straightforward footing that crimes, torts and
breaches of contract are all things that we have no right to do.25 However, if we
are to take seriously Lord Hoffmann’s assertion that cases which would formerly
have constituted three-party intimidation ought now to be seen as falling within
the broader, unlawful means tort, Hazel Carty’s much narrower approach –
which recognises only threats to commit civil wrongs – may seem nearer the
mark.
For her, the starting point in reaching this conclusion is the proposition that,
‘the concept [of unlawfulness] must be the same in this tort . . . as in the unlawful
means tort if these torts are ever to achieve a rational development’.26 A little later
she asserts that, in relation to three-party cases involving intimidation, ‘threat-
ened unlawful acts are [to be] equated to the unlawful acts themselves’.27 This
then commits her to a narrow conception of unlawful threats: namely, one
which recognises only threats to commit a civil wrong. More fully: since the
only acts that count for the purposes of the OBG tort are civil wrongs, and since
three-party intimidation is now a sub-species of that tort, it must follow for Carty
– who insists on equating the threat and the act threatened – that the only threats
which count are those to commit civil wrongs. A threat to commit a crime with
no tort law counterpart could not be explained in terms of the unlawful means
tort. The threat in question could only be equated with a crime, and there would
accordingly be an absence of the requisite civil wrong.
While it cannot be denied that Carty’s approach ensures a simple means of
achieving her (and Lord Hoffmann’s) desired goal of bringing three-party cases
involving intimidation within the fold of the broader, unlawful means tort,28 it
is by no means problem-free. Indeed, her insistence upon equating the threat
made with the civil wrong actually threatened – quite apart from receiving no
support from OBG or any other case – can be met with at least four further
objections which ought to be noted in order to mark the limitations of what
their Lordships otherwise regarded as helpful analysis.29 One of them – best
25 For example, in Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710, 724, Lord Denning expressed the view that threats
of ‘violence or a tort or a breach of contract’ would all suffice.
26 Carty, n 13 above, 113.
27 ibid, 120. Lest it be thought that this is simply infelicitous expression on Carty’s part, it is perhaps
worth noting that she makes exactly the same claim in H. Carty, ‘The Economic Torts in the 21st
Century’ (2008) 124 LQR 641, 668.
28 As Carty puts it: ‘[a]fter OBG . . . three-party intimidation has been formally assimilated into the
three-party unlawful means tort’: ibid, 120. As indicated earlier, I agree that this assimilation has
occurred, hence my using the somewhat cumbersome phrase here of ‘three-party cases involving
intimidation’ instead of the potentially misleading, but pithier, ‘cases of three-party intimidation’.
Hereinafter, any reference to ‘three-party intimidation’ should be understood as one of conveni-
ence, and one that refers to an instance of the broader, OBG tort in which the requisite element
of unlawful means is supplied by way of an unlawful threat.
29 No fewer than three of their Lordships acknowledged the general helpfulness of Carty’s analysis
of the economic torts: see OBG v Allan n 10 above at [65] and [195], per Lords Hoffmann and
Nicholls, and at [306], per Baroness Hale. There is, therefore, a danger that without exposing the
flaws in Carty’s analysis on this matter, their Lordships might be taken implicitly to have signed
up to it. In fact, they were silent on her examination of the relationship between the threats made
and the acts threatened.
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glimpsed through the lens of prospective remedies – is rather technical and is
better dealt with in the fourth part of this article, where the putative overlap
between two-party intimidation and economic duress falls for consideration.
The remaining three, however, can perfectly well be dealt with here.
The first of these objections is that Carty’s reasoning seems wrongheaded. In
OBG, their Lordships were at pains to show that the general tort of causing loss
by unlawful means had its origins in the 17th century, three-party intimidation
case of Garrett v Taylor30 (where the defendant had threatened would-be pur-
chasers of quarried stone with ‘mayhem’ if they continued to buy from the
claimant). One would assume, therefore, that it ought to be the job of the
general, unlawful means tort to remain faithfully aligned to the structure of
its progenitor, rather than for three-party intimidation – reconceptualised if
necessary – to fit the structure of the OBG tort.31 It is, in other words, an odd
thing for Carty to suggest that the burden of conforming – the one tort with the
other – should be placed upon the original tort of intimidation so long as one
recognises and takes seriously the claim made in OBG that the current law has
its antecedents in Garrett, and so long as one recognises that nothing said in OBG
cast the slightest doubt on the correctness of that earlier decision. In any case,
Carty elsewhere maintains that their Lordships were right to have ‘followed a
“back to basics” approach’.32 In so saying, she simply reinforces the point that the
OBG tort should be the one understood in the light of the earlier cases, rather
than vice versa. And since there is nothing in Garrett or any of the other ancient
cases that suggests that unlawful threats are to be equated with the acts actually
threatened, it is hard if not impossible to interpret any of those cases as laying
down that rule.
The second objection to Carty’s claim that the threat made ought to be
equated with the act threatened is that it simply cannot be reconciled with Lord
Hodson’s declaration in Rookes that, ‘the vice of the respondents’ action is the
threat to break and not the breach itself’.33 In saying this, his Lordship clearly
afforded independent, normative significance to unlawful threats. It is one thing
to insist that an unlawful threat be parasitic or contingent upon an unlawful act,
but it is altogether another to require the unlawful act and the unlawful threat to
be assimilated, or equated with one another.
The third objection is that Carty’s analysis necessitates an unpalatably narrow,
and legally ungrounded, conception of unlawful threats. Let us be clear, for her,
only threats to do something that would be an actionable wrong against the
person threatened will count in a case of three-party intimidation. She does not
30 n 1 above.
31 As a general matter, it need not necessarily follow that when faced with an incoherent whole, any
given part of that incoherent whole must be modified or relaxed in order to achieve coherence.
However, it is plain from the decision in OBG that their Lordships exhibited a commitment to
resolving the incoherence in the economic torts by conceptualising the unlawful means tort in the
light of the original three-party intimidation cases. Furthermore, Carty specifically congratulates
the House of Lords on adopting this approach to restoring rationality to this area of the law: Carty,
n 13 above, 23.
32 Carty, ibid.
33 Rookes (1964) n 3 above, 1200–1201.
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say this explicitly,34 but it is nonetheless something that can safely be inferred
from the conjunction of two other claims that she does make. The first, already
noted, is that there ought to be ‘a rational development’ of three-party intimi-
dation alongside the unlawful means tort (for which rational development she
sees a common meaning of unlawfulness to be essential).35 The second is her
claim, also noted earlier, that in cases of three-party intimidation, the threats in
question must be ‘equated to the unlawful acts’. From a conjunction of these two
points it must follow that, for Carty, whatever counts as unlawful means in the
context of the OBG tort will also, of necessity, govern those threats that will
count for the purposes of three-party intimidation. And as to the meaning of the
former, we must turn to Lord Hoffmann’s speech in OBG. He said this:
In my opinion, subject to one qualification, acts against a third party count as
unlawful means only if they are actionable by that third party. The qualification is
that they will also be unlawful means if the only reason why they are not actionable
is because the third party has suffered no loss.36
In the light of this narrow meaning of unlawful acts, it must follow for Carty that
unlawful threats must be limited to threats of acts which, if performed, would
confer a right of action on the threatened person. In other words, on Carty’s
analysis, there could be no tortious liability on the part of a threat-maker in the
following scenario.
Suppose that X threatens Y that he will physically harm Y’s son, S, unless Y
quits working for Z forthwith. In such a case, if the threat were to be equated
with the act threatened, then the relevant act would be the battery of S rather
than some unlawful act committed directly against Y. However, since the
commission of a battery against S is not something that would ordinarily confer
a right of action upon Y,37 the battery committed against S would fall beyond the
class of acts countenanced by Lord Hoffmann (ie, those which, if performed,
would confer a right of action on the threatened person). In such a case, then,
on Carty’s analysis – insistent as it is that the threat must be equated with the act
that has been threatened – it would necessarily follow that Z would be denied
a cause of action based on the OBG tort (which, recall, has now subsumed cases
of three-party intimidation) if Y were to succumb to X’s threat.
But can we seriously entertain the idea that such a threat is not a sufficiently
unlawful one for the purposes of the tort of intimidation? After all, Lord Hodson
was insistent in Rookes that, ‘the vice of the [defendants’] action is the threat to
34 Oddly, however, she does make this claim explicitly in relation to two-party intimidation (Carty,
n 13 above, 121). That said, just a few paragraphs earlier, she expresses the view that ‘the two-party
tort of intimidation is in fact a “case apart”’: ibid, 120.
35 Carty, ibid, 115.
36 OBG n 10 above at [49].
37 One might seek to argue that it would be still be a tort against Y if one knew that beating up Y’s
son would lead to Y quitting his job with Z in order to nurse his son. But there can be no
guarantee that Y would act in this way. For example, his son might be an adult with health
insurance that would cover the nursing costs, or Y may suffer from a disability that would prevent
him from nursing his son. In short, there can be no commitment to the idea that the battery of
Y’s son must necessarily entail a tort against Y, as well.
John Murphy
© 2014 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2014 The Modern Law Review Limited.
41(2014) 77(1) MLR 33–59
break [the contract] and not the breach itself’,38 and in the parallel context of
duress in contract law it is now established that threats to commit a tort against
the employees of the claimant will suffice insofar as they coerce the will of the
claimant.39 To sum up, the third objection to Carty’s narrow conception of
unlawful threats inheres in the fact that it causes us to lose sight of what is
genuinely wrong with the making of unlawful threats: the coercion of the
threatened person. To return to the example just given, if we equate the threat
with the actual commission of a battery against S, we inevitably overlook, and
thus fail to attach normative significance to, the independently wrongful coer-
cion of Y’s will.
Notably, attention to coercion per se is firmly entrenched in both the criminal
law and contract law. Under the former, the crime of blackmail centres upon a
coercive threat, even though the threat made is to do something lawful.40 In the
typical case, it involves the threat to reveal a compromising secret about the
victim.41 Similarly, in contract law, the idea of ‘lawful act duress’ seems capable
of being invoked in order to render a contract voidable,42 where, again, it is the
coercion of the victim, rather than the illegitimacy of the act threatened, that is
salient. There is no obvious reason, therefore, to take umbrage at the idea that
tort law might similarly focus merely upon the coerciveness of the threat. Indeed,
there is no logical inconsistency between making one liable for a threat to do
something, even if the doing of that thing would not result in tortious liability
to the person threatened.43 In any event, as will be seen in more detail in the next
38 Rookes (1964) n 3 above, 1200–1201.
39 Gulf Azov Shipping Co Ltd v Idisi [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 727.
40 The fact that A has the right to do X might be thought an excellent reason to treat as lawful a mere
threat to do X. Yet this is the so-called ‘paradox of blackmail’. Unravelling this paradox has taxed
many jurists; and a symposium held in the early 1990s at the University of Pennsylvania produced
a decent body of theoretical literature associated with blackmail. This literature appears in a 1993
special issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. What I take to be the most compelling
of the theoretical accounts on offer there is G. P. Fletcher, ‘Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime’
(1993) 141 U Pa L Rev 1617 where (at 1626) the gist of the crime is identified in the fact that ‘D
creates a situation in which D can or does dominate V’. The parallel with my own identification
of the infringement of a victim’s autonomy in the tort of intimidation is, I think, a close one. For
an historical account of the genesis and development of blackmail in England and Wales, see P.
Alldridge, ‘“Attempted Murder of the Soul”: Blackmail, Privacy and Secrets’ (1993) 13 OJLS 370.
41 For the use of two-party intimidation in such a case, see AS v Murray [2013] NSWSC 733. But
note that there was arguably a civil wrong threatened here: namely, a threat to breach the equitable
obligation of confidence where D threatened to reveal to C’s wife and family the fact that C had
been using an internet dating agency.
42 See CTN Cash & Carry v Gallagher [1994] 4 All ER 714. For an attempt to rationalise lawful act
duress in terms of abuse of right analysis, see J. Neyers, ‘Explaining the Inexplicable? Four
Manifestations of Abuse of Rights in English Law’ in D. Nolan and A. Robertson (eds), Rights and
Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 324 et seq.
43 It is even conceivable that threats to do something lawful could suffice. This is because tort law,
at a certain level of abstraction, concerns itself with purposive activity (against which backdrop all
the rights and duties recognised by tort law become intelligible): that is, tort law concerns itself
with protecting the pursuit of one’s own projects (see, eg, E. J. Weinrib, ‘Correlativity, Person-
ality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice’ (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1,
13–20). However, just because one may do X as a matter of right (even if so doing causes loss to
another), does not necessarily or logically entail that threatening to do X, simply in order to coerce
another, must also fall within the purview of the protected pursuit of one’s own projects. In order
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section, there is a wealth of authority that identifies coercion as the gist of the
tort. Furthermore, given the fact that the balance of authority suggests that
threats to commit crimes count in this context, it is hard to see why – if we are
to ignore the coercion of the threatened person’s will, and accept Carty’s
approach – such threats should ever ground a tort action based on intimidation.
As already noted there is no good reason to treat as tortious a threat to commit
a crime if the threat is merely to be equated with the actual commission of that
crime.
One vitally important consequence of accepting that unlawful threats are not
to be equated with the acts actually threatened is that we are then left with little
choice other than to attach independent, normative significance to unlawful
threats per se. Without so doing, there is no conceptual space for the idea –
explicitly advanced in OBG – that three-party intimidation is a mere example or
subspecies of the general unlawful means tort. It is precisely because the threat is
itself an actionable wrong that a third party claimant seeking to invoke the
unlawful means tort is able to do so. In such a case, the unlawful threat assumes
the mantle of the requisite unlawful means. Put tersely, in order for the three-
party version of the tort of intimidation to be seen plausibly as a mere subspecies
of the general OBG principle, there must of necessity be prior acceptance of the
independently tortious quality of two-party intimidation.
So what, in the light of these observations, will in fact count as unlawful
threats for the purposes of this tort? I would submit that the cases suggest a broad
conception of unlawful threats: one that includes not only threats to commit civil
wrongs against the person threatened, but also threats to commit civil wrongs
against third parties, such as those with whom the threatened person enjoys a
strong bond of affection (as in the example of Y’s son already given), and possibly
also those with whom the threatened person enjoys a regular and/or especially
valuable trading (or other economic) relationship.44 I would also suggest that
threats to commit crimes of any complexion ought to suffice on the strength of
Lord Devlin having said as much in Rookes.45 But this is not an uncontroversial
matter. It is, after all, perfectly true that in the wake of Lonrho Ltd v Shell
Petroleum Co Ltd46 (Lonrho) there may be legitimate doubt about whether a threat
to contravene a purely penal statute (the breach of which does not give rise to
a civil cause of action) will suffice in this context. The current edition of Clerk
and Lindsell on Torts certainly considers it to be an ‘absurdity that they [ie, the
defendants in that case] would be liable if they threatened [to breach the statute],
but not liable if they deliberately inflicted the damage by the same illegal
to achieve this result, however, English tort law would have to abandon its current position with
respect to the civilian notion of ‘abuse of rights’, for such abuses of right are not presently tortious:
Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700, 718–19, per Lord Dunedin.
44 So far as this second example is concerned, it is perhaps worth stressing that its inclusion here
should not be taken to represent any kind of commitment on my part to the idea that intimidation
is best understood as an economic tort. Indeed, the example is in no way inconsistent with the
important claim made elsewhere in this section that the tort of intimidation has nothing specifi-
cally to do with the infliction of economic harm.
45 Rookes (1964) n 3 above, 1206–1207.
46 [1982] AC 173.
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means’.47 However, with respect, this is to miss the point. It is to be seduced by
the same illusory equation of the threat made and the act threatened that Carty
insists upon. The fact that the breach of a purely penal statute may not ground
a tort action is irrelevant to the question of whether an illegal threat has coerced
the person threatened into a certain course of conduct.
More profoundly, there is a second reason for rejecting the idea that a threat
to breach a purely penal statute ought not to count for present purposes. It is that
Lonrho was not a case about coercive threats. It offers no more than obiter dicta on
the point and is by no means on a par – in terms of its standing as a precedent
– with the still leading case of Rookes. Thus, as a technical matter, we ought to
prefer as a statement of existing law what Lord Devlin had to say. And he, it will
be recalled, was firmly of the view that threats to commit offences of any kind
suffice.
Actionable harm
In Morgan v Fry, Lord Denning averred bluntly that only ‘the person damnified
by the compliance [with a threat] can sue for intimidation’.48 But so saying hardly
illuminates what it means to be ‘damnified’ in this context. Fortunately, a
number of judges in a range of other cases have been more explicit about what
is required. And, notably, they have tended to coalesce around a common idea
of what more precisely constitutes the gist of this tort. In Newsgroup Newspapers
Ltd v SOGAT (’82) Stuart-Smith J opined that:
If a threat is little more than idle abuse and is not to be taken seriously, then it would
not be sufficient to found an action for intimidation. Indeed, the tort is not complete
unless the person threatened succumbs to the threat and damage is suffered.49
What was clearly to the fore, here, was the idea that coercion of the threatened
person’s will is central to the commission of this tort.50 Furthermore, such
thinking can also be found in the leading case of Rookes where Lord Devlin
opined that, ‘[t]he essence of the offence is coercion . . . [and] the plaintiff who
suffers by the aversion of the act threatened can legally claim that he is illegally
injured’.51 A little later in his speech, his Lordship added: ‘[a]ll that matters to the
plaintiff is that, metaphorically speaking, a club has been used’.52 No less explic-
itly, Lord Evershed also remarked that, ‘the threat, properly understood . . . had
a real and substantial coercive force’ and ‘[a]s such . . . [the] threat itself consti-
tuted a cause of action’.53
47 M. Jones (ed), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 20th ed, 2010) 1650.
48 Morgan v Fry [1968] 1 QB 521, 724.
49 n 24 above, 204.
50 However, coercion is not the be all and end all. It is merely a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition of liability. There must also be harm suffered. And, as noted earlier, for the coercion to
count, it must have been brought about by an unlawful threat.
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A slightly more elaborate iteration of just such thinking was supplied, once
again, by Lord Denning MR in Stratford & Son v Lindley when he said:
it is essential to the cause of action that the person threatened should comply with
the demand. If he has the courage to resist it . . . then the party threatened has no
cause of action for intimidation . . . [for] they have suffered no damage by the
threat . . . [and it] is essential to the cause of action that the threat should be a
coercive threat . . . It must be intended to coerce a person into doing something
that he is unwilling to do or not doing something that he wishes to do . . . A bare
threat without a demand does not to my mind amount to the tort of
intimidation.54
What these various dicta consistently urge is that it is the infringement of free
agency by way of an unlawful threat that forms the gist of this tort. They
make plain the fact that the tort of intimidation is animated by the forcing of
the threatened person into a course of conduct that he would not himself
choose to pursue, thus puncturing his autonomy. And while autonomy is
seldom expressly acknowledged to be a protected interest in tort law, it pro-
vides the most plausible rationale for the tort of false imprisonment as well as
the solatium given in wrongful birth cases.55
Another jurist to have noted this element of the tort is Robert Stevens. He,
too, regards the fact of coercion as central to its operation. Thus, he argues, ‘[i]f
D threatens to break X’s legs unless he ceases to trade with C, D is [by getting
X to act in this way] using X, or perhaps more accurately the right of X, for his
own ends in order to cause loss to C’.56 It is, therefore, only once X accedes to
the threat that D can be said to have abused the ‘the right of X’ to free agency:
the right, in other words, to choose for himself the way in which he will act in
a given set of circumstances.57 Indeed, it is worth stressing that, by contrast with
those threats which animate the tort of assault (which is actionable per se), the
threats required by the tort of intimidation are not, by themselves, enough to
ground a cause of action.58 They must always be accompanied by – indeed, cause
– a genuine infringement of the victim’s autonomy. This infringement of the
victim’s autonomy is manifested by the fact that she has been coerced into a
course of conduct that she would not otherwise choose to pursue; that she has,
54 [1965] AC 269, 283.
55 See, eg, Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309.
56 R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 190.
57 For the most developed account of the centrality of free agency, encapsulated in the concept of
Kantian Right, to the operation and understanding of tort law generally, see E. J. Weinrib, The
Idea of Private Law Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995) ch 4.
58 The tort of assault must undoubtedly be understood in terms of threats. Yet, in that context,
there is no need to prove any consequential, tangible harm. An assault is simply a threat that
affects psychological integrity, and it could well be argued that intimidatory threats do likewise
(by causing the victim to suffer enduring anxiety about whether the threat-maker will actually
go through with his or her threat). This opens a series of interesting questions about just which
forms of psychological harm should count for tort law, and in what circumstances. They are not,
however, questions relevant to this paper. It suffices for present purposes to note merely that the
tort of intimidation (unlike assault) requires proof of harm in the form of the coercion of the
will.
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as Lamond puts it, suffered an ‘infringement of the control which [she ordinarily]
enjoys over some sphere’ of her life.59
The interpretation of the law offered here clearly chimes with Lord Denning
MR’s obiter observation in Morgan v Fry that:
there must be a threat by one person to use unlawful means (such as violence or
breach of contract) so as to compel another to obey his wishes. And the person so
threatened must comply with the demand rather than risk the threat being carried
into execution.60
A yet more succinct endorsement of this portrayal of the law may be gleaned
from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Godwin v Uzoigwe61 (Godwin). There, a
woman was kept as a ‘domestic drudge’, someone who was ‘virtually a slave’.
She was forced – by way of ‘implied threats of further assaults’ – to work such
excessive hours by her captors that Dillon LJ was content to allow her to sue
them on the basis of two-party intimidation. Crucial to his finding was his
understanding of the gist of the tort: namely, that ‘intimidation is intentional
unlawful coercion’.62
The case is a highly significant one because it grounds no fewer than four
further, important observations. The first of these is that Godwin – along
with Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd,63 Gilbert v Stone,64 Newsgroup
Newspapers Ltd v SOGAT (’82)65 and AS v Murray66 – provides concrete
evidence of the existence of a two-party tort of intimidation. In Rookes, by
contrast, the existence of such a tort had only really been canvassed in theoretical
terms; while in OBG, as noted earlier, Lord Hoffmann seemed, on balance,
doubtful about its continued vitality. The second observation to be drawn from
Godwin is that, if two-party intimidation exists as a tort, then a three-party
version of the tort is unnecessary. This is because, in a three-party scenario, the
threatened intermediary will have been the victim of an actionable (or potentially
actionable) civil wrong, thus providing evidence of sufficient unlawful means to
ground an action based on the unlawful means tort minted in OBG.
The third observation to which Godwin gives rise is that, in its two-party
form, the tort of intimidation is better seen as something other than a tort
59 G. Lamond, ‘Coercion, Threats and the Puzzle of Blackmail’ in A. P. Simester and A. T. H. Smith
(eds), Harm and Culpability (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 237. Lamond’s paper offers a much fuller
account of autonomy and its manifestation as the ability to exert control over a certain state of
affairs than space permits here (ibid 233–235).
60 n 25 above, 724.
61 [1993] Fam Law 65.
62 ibid.
63 [2010] 1 CLC 256. For further analysis of this case, see ‘Intimidation and Contract Law’ below.
64 n 1 above. See in particular the dictum reproduced at n 1 above.
65 n 24 above. Only the action against the seventh defendant turned on two-party intimidation.
66 n 41 above. In this case, C had been using an internet dating service but did not want his wife and
family to know about this. D, however, threatened to tell C’s family unless C paid D a large
amount of money. Although C did not plead intimidation, the trial judge found for him on this
basis (at [14]), relying on the crime of extortion which is defined under the Crimes Act (NSW),
ss 249K and 249M in terms of making menacing threats with intention of obtaining a gain.
(Thanks to Neil Foster for alerting me to this case.)
Understanding Intimidation
© 2014 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2014 The Modern Law Review Limited.
46 (2014) 77(1) MLR 33–59
specifically concerned with the protection of economic interests.67 It is, instead,
as the facts of Godwin vividly illustrate, a wrong committed against human
autonomy. This, of course, explains why actual coercion of the will has so
repeatedly been insisted upon by the courts. From this third observation follows
the rather more radical fourth. It is that if two-party intimidation is not, in strict
juridical terms, an economic tort, then the House of Lords would seem to have
erred in placing so much reliance on it in Total Network where their Lordships’
chief concern was to resurrect the phoenix of unlawful means conspiracy from
the ashes of OBG on the basis that that tort also represented a form of two-party
liability in respect of economic interests.68 Put more succinctly, the edifice of
unlawful means conspiracy – a specifically economic tort according to their
Lordships – would seem to have been constructed in significant measure on the
distinctly dubious foundations of two-party intimidation given that the latter has
nothing especially to do with the protection of economic interests.69
OBG AND THREE-PARTY INTIMIDATION REVISITED
In OBG, in his endeavour to import new order into the general economic torts,
Lord Hoffmann undertook a thoroughgoing review of their historical develop-
ment. In particular, he suggested that the muddled state of the law was due in
large part to the fact that the courts had consistently failed to appreciate the
various, fundamental, juridical connections and distinctions that existed between
the two main causes of action he identified. As noted already, the ancient cases
of Garrett v Taylor70 and Tarleton v M’Gawley71 formed the starting point for his
analysis of the unlawful means tort.72 His first observation about those cases was
this: ‘[Because they] involved the use of unlawful threats to intimidate potential
customers, Salmond on Torts had classified them as “intimidation” cases’.73 He
then went on to point out that judicial confirmation of this tort’s existence was
supplied by the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard. However, in the very next
sentence of his speech, he opined that, since ‘an interference with the liberty of
others by unlawful means does not require threats’ it must follow that ‘Salmond’s
tort of intimidation is therefore only one variant of a broader tort, usually called
for short “causing loss by unlawful means”’.74
67 Hazel Carty recognises this, too: see Carty, n 13 above, 116 and 121.
68 n 15 above. The weight attached to it is evident in the speeches of Lord Hope (at [43]), Lord
Mance (at [124]), Lord Walker (at [99]) and Lord Neuberger (at [223]).
69 The idea that intimidation is in truth a genuine economic tort would require it to be centrally
concerned with the protection of a right not to have economic loss inflicted upon one. So
construing the tort, however, would render two of the few reported cases – namely, Godwin and
Gilbert – unintelligible. It would also do violence to the eminently defensible default position of
the common law: ie, that there is a free-standing right not to have economic loss inflicted upon
one (on which see P. Benson, ‘The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law’
in D. G. Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 1993)).
70 n 1 above.
71 n 1 above.
72 OBG v Allan n 10 above at [6].
73 ibid at [7].
74 ibid.
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Now, while there is nothing per se objectionable about his reasoning here,
what does get called into question is his attempt, somewhat later in the speech,
to sideline (and thereby cast doubt upon) the vitality of two-party intimidation.
Recall his words: ‘I do not intend to say anything about the question of whether
a claimant who has been compelled by unlawful intimidation to act to his own
detriment, can sue for his loss [since] . . . “two party intimidation” raises alto-
gether different issues’.75 Yet, since the presence of unlawful means is central to
the operation of the ‘broader tort’, it seems wrongheaded to express uncertainty
about the independent significance of the effect of A’s threat upon B. If A
threatening B so as to compel B into a course of conduct that B would not
otherwise pursue for himself is not independently actionable (or at least poten-
tially so), there can never be, according to Lord Hoffmann’s conception of the
‘broader tort’, any prospect of a third party, C, invoking that tort against A (in
circumstances where A’s threat caused B to act in a fashion that was injurious to
C). Importantly, this is true whether one believes it to be coercion of the will or
the equating of the threat with the act threatened that forms the gist of this tort.
Either way, a case of three-party intimidation cannot logically be treated as a
mere example of the broader tort without first acknowledging the independent
tortious quality of two-party intimidation.76
A further observation to which the typical three-party case gives rise is the fact
that the defendant’s intention must pertain to the intermediary’s choice of
conduct rather than the matter of whether that intermediary suffers any eco-
nomic loss. In a three-party case, it is immaterial whether the threatened
intermediary suffers any such loss, whereas, by contrast, it is vital that he should
act in the way that the defendant intends. Without so doing, the third party, who
is the defendant’s real target, will remain unharmed. Accordingly, three-party
cases – notwithstanding the fact that they are now to be regarded as a mere
sub-branch of the broader, unlawful means tort – nonetheless supply yet further
evidence that, in its two-party guise, the tort of intimidation is not specifically
linked to the infliction of economic loss.77 The commission of the two-party tort
is simply what supplies the requisite unlawful means in a three-party scenario.
Some – albeit oblique – recognition of this point is discernible elsewhere in
Lord Hoffmann’s speech. When discussing his exception to the rule that the
unlawful means must be (potentially) actionable by the intermediary in a case
involving the ‘broader tort’, he noted that, ‘[i]n the case of intimidation . . . the
threat will usually give rise to no cause of action by the [threatened] third party
75 ibid at [61].
76 For the suggestion that two-party intimidation can be seen as distinct and that it may require mere
illegitimate (as opposed to unlawful) threats see J. Edelman, ‘A Historical Essay on Duress,
Intimidation and Menaces’ [2011] Journal of Corporate Affairs and Corporate Crimes 1. For Edelman,
the requirement of unlawfulness is seemingly a mere control device used to limit ‘the indirect and
potentially expansive liability which can arise in those cases’: ibid, 9.
77 In cases where intimidation is used against an intermediary, it may be rare for the threat-maker to
intend the intermediary to suffer economic harm and it is in fact doubtful that the defendants in
Rookes ever intended the employer to suffer financial loss. In three-party-cases, the prime target
of the threat is C; and all that is necessary to visit this harm upon C is that the intermediary, I, acts
in the way D intends her to act, rather than in the way she would herself choose to act.
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because he will have suffered no loss’.78 Yet in so saying, his Lordship implicitly
conveys an acknowledgement that, at least sometimes, the threat itself could give
rise to an actionable wrong in the hands of the intermediary.79
INTIMIDATION AND CONTRACT LAW
Two main ‘problems’ concerning the inter-relation of contract law and intimi-
dation have been identified in previous scholarship. The first, and by far the
easiest to deal with, arises in the three-party setting where it is alleged that
the tort of intimidation effectively undermines the privity of contract doctrine.
The second concerns the potential redundancy of two-party intimidation on the
supposed basis that existing contract law principles already cater adequately for
the kinds of unlawful threats on which this tort draws. Each of these ‘problems’
will be considered in turn.
Intimidation and privity of contract
In the wake of the decision in Rookes, Wedderburn expressed the supposed
‘privity problem’ in these terms:
Never before in English Law has a third party been allowed to rely for his cause of
action on a breach of contractual obligations existing between two other persons or
on any threat of such a breach. This novel manoeuvre may be said to deny the most
basic distinctions between tort and contract.80
Wedderburn’s worry, however, was based on a fundamental misconception
of what the claimant is attempting to do. In a three-party-case of the kind
Wedderburn had in mind, the claimant is seeking redress not on the basis of the
contract between the threat-maker and the intermediary, but on the basis of
the unlawful means that have been used against an intermediary in order to strike
at the claimant and cause him loss.81 Put tersely, the claimant’s action exists
completely independently of any contract action which vests in the intermediary.
78 n 10 above at [49].
79 Unfortunately, at this point in his speech, Lord Hoffmann went on to suggest that only threats to
commit a civil wrong against the intermediary would count. Yet, as we noted at length in the
previous section, there is nothing in the earlier case law that constrains the meaning of unlawful
threats in this way. Rather, in Rookes, Lord Devlin was emphatically of the view that ‘the essence
of the offence is coercion’. He stopped short of adding words to the effect, ‘via threats directed
at the threatened person that would, if carried out, justify the threatened person bringing a civil
action against the person making the threat’. In any event, this segment of Lord Hoffmann’s
opinion needs to be read in context. For at this juncture he was not directly concerned with what
formed the gist of intimidation, but instead with trying to provide an example of an exception to
his actionable civil wrong criterion. It was, therefore, mere obiter dictum. And it is simply a matter
of coincidence that he unfortunately created the impression – contrary to Rookes – that only
threats to commit civil wrongs will count for the purposes of the tort of intimidation.
80 Wedderburn, n 5 above, 261.
81 Hazel Carty also considers Wedderburn’s privity of contract objection to be a ‘red herring’: see
Carty, n 13 above, 117.
John Murphy
© 2014 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2014 The Modern Law Review Limited.
49(2014) 77(1) MLR 33–59
In fact, a far bigger problem, from the perspective of juridical nicety – yet one that
need not trouble us here – is the fact that the three-party version of intimidation,
now subsumedwithin the broader tort of causing loss by unlawfulmeans, conflicts
with the privity principle that generally obtains within the law of torts.82
Beyond this, there is a second misconception on Wedderburn’s part that
serves to undermine the force of his concern. It stems from the fact that he sees
the tort/contract divide as sacrosanct, as somehow rigid and immutable. But of
course, the tort/contract divide is neither of these things, as the readily demon-
strable prospect of concurrent liability in tort and contract makes plain,83 along
with the hybrid action for inducing a breach of contract.84 As such, there is no
robust objection based on the privity of contract doctrine that can be mounted
against three-party intimidation – either (formerly) in its own right, or (since
OBG) as a subspecies of the unlawful means tort.
Existing contract law and the redundancy of intimidation
The second putative problem concerning the relationship between intimidation
and contract law centres on the proposition that two-party intimidation is,
ultimately, redundant. This supposed redundancy is bound up with the idea or
assumption that contract law already deals adequately with the various situations
that could be regarded as instances of two-party intimidation. Indeed, it might
well be this element of overlap with contract law that Lord Hoffmann had in
mind when he suggested that cases of two-party intimidation raise ‘altogether
different issues’. Certainly, McBride and Bagshaw see this potential inter-relation
82 As one prominent scholar has explained: in tort law, ordinarily, ‘[t]he only person who can
enforce a right is the right-holder, and persons who suffer loss because of the infringement of
someone else’s right do not have standing to sue’: Stevens, n 56 above, 173. Stevens expressly
recognises that the unlawful means tort is an exception to the normal privity rule in tort. Indeed,
he describes the claimant’s action in terms of being able to ‘“piggy back” upon the infringement
of [the intermediary’s] rights’: ibid, 188.
83 One example of concurrence concerns liability for defective products which may well support not
just a tort action but also one based on contract. Equally, the House of Lords put it beyond doubt
that concurrent liability may exist under the tort of negligence and in contract in Henderson v
Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, 193–194, per Lord Goff (Henderson). The only real problem
arises where one body of rules conflicts with, and thus threatens to undermine, the other. For
example, it could be argued that contract law endeavours to provide for the ex-ante allocation of
costs and risks via its rules on formation and remoteness of damage. This ex-ante allocation, the
argument holds, could be upset if a claim in two-party intimidation were to be available where
contract law would furnish the claimant with no remedy. However, Lord Goff anticipated just
such a problem in Henderson and stipulated that concurrent liability would be subject to the
tortious duty not undermining the one in contract (ibid, 194). In the present context, however,
the wrongs addressed respectively by contract and tort are so different – as per the argument that
follows – that this prospect of the one undermining the other does not really arise.
84 The fact that this cause of action displays hybrid – contract/tort – qualities is also explored in S.
Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning
(Cambridge: CUP, 2003) 29–30. Further, in OBG, the fact that the tort/contract divide is not
sacrosanct was made plain by reference to the way in which the action for inducing breach of
contract was portrayed in that case. Lord Hoffmann made clear that although the relevant liability
was tortious in nature, it was also a form of accessory liability in which the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing
consisted in being an accessory to a breach of contract: n 10 above at [4]–[5].
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with existing principles of contract law as ‘[o]ne reason why Lord Hoffmann did
not simply confirm the existence of the [two-party] tort’.85 The current edition
of Clerk and Lindsell on Torts also posits that, ‘[t]he problem of “two-party”
intimidation is really caused by acceptance of breach of contract as an “unlawful
act”’,86 while the most recent edition of Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort does
likewise.87 More specifically, the thinking behind such claims is that, ‘[t]he
claimant already has sufficient protection and remedies . . . [via] his contract
rights – including the right to sue for anticipatory breach – when the threat to
break the contract is made by the defendant’.88
A further dimension to the redundancy argument centres on the fact that,
even if we put to one side the above claim about the overlap with the antici-
patory breach doctrine, there will nonetheless be many cases in which the
doctrines of duress and economic duress might be thought the more appropriate
means of resolving a case that could otherwise be conceived in terms of two-
party intimidation. McBride and Bagshaw implicitly sign up to this approach,
arguing as they do that, ‘it would be unsatisfactory if these doctrines said that the
contract was enforceable, or the money could be retained, but tort law insisted
that B should be compensated by A for the loss caused by the threat’.89 In other
words, they oppose the idea that two-party intimidation might furnish a remedy
where contract law would not.
Each of these aspects of the overlap with the law of contract offers an
ostensibly plausible understanding of the ‘altogether different issues’ that Lord
Hoffmann may well have had in mind when gesturing towards90 – if not
explicitly stating – the future redundancy of two-party intimidation. However,
as I explain below, none can truly ground the notion that two-party intimidation
is an otiose cause of action.
Intimidation, duress and economic duress
At least three major obstacles obstruct our acceptance of the suggestion that
two-party intimidation is redundant by virtue of the law of contract being able
to deal adequately with coercive threats via the duress and economic duress
doctrines.91 The first is a fairly obvious one, which the various commentators
mentioned above seem nonetheless to have overlooked: namely, there is no
a priori reason why there must be a contractual nexus between the person
85 McBride and Bagshaw, n 20 above, 682.
86 Jones (ed), n 47 above, 1653.
87 W. V. H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2010) 881.
88 Carty, n 13 above, 119. For an essentially similar claim, see Rogers, ibid, 1653–1654.
89 McBride and Bagshaw, n 20 above, 682.
90 This gesturing towards redundancy, as noted earlier, is deducible from the regularity with which
his Lordship stressed the fact that the economic torts could be rationalised by recognising a simple,
two-tort structure which affords conceptual space to only the unlawful means tort (involving three
parties) and the tort of inducing breach of contract (also involving three parties).
91 For a further, more philosophically oriented, account of the distinction between coercive threats
(which require primary attention to be afforded to the ‘perspective of the dominant party’) and
duress (which is a ‘victim-centred concept’ concerned with whether the victim’s conduct is
excusable), see Lamond, n 59 above, 219–221.
John Murphy
© 2014 The Author. The Modern Law Review © 2014 The Modern Law Review Limited.
51(2014) 77(1) MLR 33–59
threatened and the person making the threat. Naturally, it is only in such
circumstances that the duress and economic doctrines become salient: the only
threats to which they attend are, first, those forcing the claimant to enter into an
unwanted contractual agreement (in the case of duress92) or, secondly, those
forcing the claimant into an unwanted and unfavourable variation of an existing
contract (in the typical case of economic duress93). But that coercive threats of
other kinds may be made is plain; for it is patently possible to issue threats which
force the person threatened into doing any number of things besides entering
into an unwanted contract (or an unfavourable variation thereof ).
A second obstacle to accepting the proposition that the doctrine of economic
duress caters perfectly well for threats made in a two-party setting can be
illustrated by reference to D & C Builders Ltd v Rees94 (Rees). For what this
famous case demonstrates is that the respective remedies available in contract and
tort are so different that they ought not to be assumed always to be of equal
value. (For the sake of clarity, it is perhaps worth stating that what follows is the
technical argument, mentioned earlier, which can also be invoked to refute
Carty’s contention that unlawful threats are to be equated with the unlawful acts
actually threatened.)
In the Rees case, the wife’s threat to the builders was, effectively, a threat to
pay just £300 (being a sum considerably lower than the amount actually owed
under the contract) or nothing at all. From the perspective of economic duress,
the wrong was the threatened breach of contract which was meant to coerce the
claimant; and in respect of this, the appropriate remedy was the setting aside of
a putative accord and satisfaction. Clearly, such a remedy would not be available
in tort law: in that context, only damages would be available. Yet if the
foreseeable damage associated with the tort were to outstrip the loss associated
with an unfavourable variation of the contract, the tort damages would provide
the victim with considerably more than invocation of the economic duress
doctrine could manage. This is because the respective remedies afforded by
contract and tort would address qualitatively different things. So, although the
prospect of concurrent liability cannot be ruled out altogether,95 nor should it be
92 As Bigwood observes, ‘[t]he unique (and narrow) burden of the duress doctrine . . . is to police
the application of coercive pressure in legal transactional contexts, that is, pressure by way of a
specific improper threat that D makes to P in order to compel P’s decision to enter into a contract
that P, as a rational person, would not have entered into in the absence of such a motive for
action’: R. Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 280.
93 It is true that Lord Goff once opined that ‘economic pressure may be sufficient to amount to
duress . . . provided at least that the economic pressure may be characterised as illegitimate and has
constituted a significant cause inducing [C] to enter into the relevant contract’: The Evia Luck
[1992] 2 AC 152, 165. However, it is also true that the term ‘economic duress’ is generally only
applied to those cases where D has coerced C into an unfavourable variation of an existing
contract. Certainly, the latter is the way in which the leading English textbook writers – basing
their exposition of the law on the decided cases – present the law on economic duress: see, eg,
E. Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2007) 443; J. O’Sullivan and
J. Hilliard, The Law of Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 259; J. Poole, Textbook on Contract Law
(Oxford: OUP, 2010) 550.
94 [1966] 2 QB 617.
95 Indeed, Lord Denning MR recognised that the threat in Rees ‘was on recent authority a case of
intimidation: see Stratford ( JT) & Son Ltd v Lindley’: ibid, 625. Equally, in a case such as Kolmar,
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assumed that the reparation available under the one branch of the law will be
identical to, or as favourable as, the remedy available under the other. The
following hypothetical seeks to provide a practical illustration of the point.
Suppose that A and B agree a contract for the sale of product X, which is to
be delivered some months later. Suppose, further, that a third business, C Ltd,
unexpectedly goes into liquidation without being able to honour a huge debt
owed to B such that the viability of B’s own business now hangs in the balance.
Next, imagine that taking advantage of B’s precarious position, A declares, ‘I
know you are desperate for money just now, so you will have to accept half the
agreed price in full settlement or else I’ll pay you nothing at all’. Finally, assume
that B accedes to this threat because of his precarious financial situation, but that,
in any event, the reduced sum proves inadequate to keep B’s business afloat
(whereas full payment would have done). In consequence, B becomes bankrupt
and suffers various knock-on losses in the form of, say, the cancellation of several
pre-arranged, extremely lucrative contracts.96
Now, while the law of contract – via the economic duress principle applied
in D & C Builders v Rees – would certainly furnish B with a remedy amounting
to the difference between the original contract price for product X and the price
actually paid by A, it would not go so far as to make good the consequential
losses associated with B’s bankruptcy. Those other losses would be attributable to
the sudden collapse of B’s debtor, C Ltd, and as such – even if A’s failure to pay
the original, agreed sum were treated as a breach of contract – B’s other losses
would be regarded as too remote under the rules laid down in Hadley v
Baxendale.97 Given the sudden and unexpected collapse of C Ltd, it would be
inapt to regard this aspect of B’s loss as having ‘arisen naturally, ie, according to
the usual course of things’, or as something that we ‘may reasonably suppose to
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the
contract’98. Tort law, on the other hand, would almost certainly furnish B with
damages that would accommodate this aspect of B’s loss.99
To be clear, what this hypothetical seeks to illustrate is that the defendant’s
threat constitutes an independent form of wrongdoing that is distinctly tortious
rather than contractual. It does not preclude the possibility of concurrent liability:
that is, the alternative of an action in contract designed to set aside a contractual
variation brought about by economic duress. However, should such concurrent
discussed below, there may even be the prospect of concurrent liability in the shape of an unjust
enrichment action for restitution of value transferred: see Edelman, n 76 above, 2.
96 Such cancellation is possible, by court order, under the Insolvency Act 1986, s 345.
97 (1854) 9 Exch 341.
98 ibid, 354, per Alderson B (emphasis added).
99 The existing cases do not make clear which test for remoteness of damage applies in the context
of intimidation. But this is immaterial here since either the ‘reasonably foreseeable type of harm’
test (associated with The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] AC 388) or that based on ‘all direct
consequences’ (and associated with Re Polemis [1923] 3 KB 560) would serve B equally well in this
example. That said, it is submitted that the direct consequences test is the stronger candidate for
use in cases involving intimidation, since this test is generally applied to torts based on intentional
wrongdoing. Also perhaps relevant would be Lord Lindley’s dictum in Quinn v Leathem [1901]
AC 495, 537 to the effect that ‘intention to injure the plaintiff negatives all excuses and disposes
of any question of remoteness of damage’.
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liability arise, the claimant would have to choose between the contract and tort
actions.100 Confirmation of such concurrent liability was provided in Kolmar
Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd101 where, although the exploitative threat
in issue was considered capable of being viewed in terms of economic duress,102
the judge in fact disposed of the case on the basis of two-party intimidation. After
acknowledging the presence of economic duress, he said this:
The tort of intimidation is established where (i) the defendant makes a demand
backed by a coercive and unlawful threat; (ii) the plaintiff complies with that demand
because of the coercive and unlawful threat; (iii) the defendant knows or should have
known that compliance with its demand will cause loss and damage to the plaintiff
and (iv) the defendant intends its demand to cause loss and damage to the plaintiff
. . . Those requirements are, as it seems to me, satisfied . . . [and] [a]ccordingly,
Kolmar is entitled to $1,405,566.61 as damages for intimidation.103
In fact, the remedial distinction point can be pressed a little further by reference
to the Canadian case of Gershmann v Manitoba Vegetable Producers’ Marketing
Board.104 There, among other things, the defendant Marketing Board was held
liable for causing the claimant to miss out on a very lucrative share option by
virtue of its intimidatory conduct. Not only did the claimant sue successfully for
the losses caused by the defendant’s intimidation, he also received a sizeable sum
by way of punitive damages which orthodox principles of contract law would
not permit.105 As Solomon J observed:
Never in all my 16 years of public life and 18 years on the bench have I come across
a more flagrant abuse of power . . . This most glaring abuse of power by the board
100 See Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, 193–194. The choice, however, must be
a genuine one. So, for example, we ought to be cautious about allowing a claimant to sue in tort
if the law of contract would not permit the claimant to invoke the economic duress doctrine in
order to escape what was obviously a bad bargain at the time of the contract’s formation, or
something that, over time, merely turns out to be a bad bargain (but which was not obviously a
bad bargain at the time of contractual variation).
101 n 63 above.
102 ‘I am quite satisfied from the evidence . . . that Kolmar agreed to amend the letters of credit to increase
the price and reduce the quantity and to accept and pay for the documents tendered as a result of
illegitimate pressure amounting to economic duress on the part of Traxpo’: ibid at [93], per Clarke J.
103 ibid at [119]–[121], per Clarke J. It is submitted that the financial losses identified here were
compensable merely because they were consequential upon the coercion of the claimant’s will in
just the same way that damages are available for consequential economic loss in the tort of
negligence where the defendant has caused the claimant property damage. The balance of
authority does not require the claimant to have suffered financial loss in order to be able to sue for
intimidation. Indeed, as the Godwin case makes clear, the degradation associated with being treated
as a slave will suffice. All that is required is that some form of damage must result from the coercion
of the claimant: see text associated with n 49 above.
104 (1976) 65 DLR 181 (3d) 114.
105 Cassel & Co v Broome [1972] AC 1027. Not only does contract law not generally countenance
punitive damages, it also sets its face against the insertion into a contract of a penalty clause (which
might be viewed as an attempt to obtain punitive damages ‘by the back door’). For the possible
reasons why contract law does not ordinarily admit punitive awards, see S. A. Smith, Contract
Theory (Oxford: OUP, 2004) 417–420.
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[ie, its intimidation of the plaintiff ] . . . should not be allowed to pass without some
assessment of punitive damages against it.106
What this passage endorses, of course, is that, viewed through the lens of
available remedies, coercive threats are eminently capable of being seen as a
discrete form of tortious wrongdoing which perfectly well permits an award of
punitive damages that would not be available under traditional principles of
contract law. Certainly, there has never been any reported case in England and
Wales in which punitive damages have been granted within the law of contract.
And while a different judicial view, starting with Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co,107
seems to have been taken in Canada in recent years, the recent preparedness to
award punitive damages in exceptional circumstances in that jurisdiction has
received severe criticism in academic circles,108 and remains juridically question-
able in so far as the court in that landmark case arguably confused the category,
‘punitive damages’, with the compensatory category, ‘aggravated damages’.109
A third basis on which to refute the argument that the economic duress
doctrine functions as a genuine and complete alternative to two-party intimi-
dation, and thus renders that tort redundant, inheres in the following. The
former only seems to attend to threats which cause the claimant to accept an
unfavourable variation in the terms of an existing contract between the two
parties.110 Thus, if A should say to B, ‘I will not honour my side of our contract
unless you make it clear to X that you are unprepared to engage in any future
commercial dealings with him’, the threat cannot permissibly be cited by B as an
instance of economic duress. The threat here – although it forced B into an
undesired variation in his extant contractual relations – did not cause B to accept
less advantageous terms in his contract with A. It simply caused B, instead, to
alter his contractual arrangements with a third party, X. This unfavourable
alteration in B’s contractual position would fall beyond the scope of the eco-
nomic duress principle as it is presently understood and applied.
Intimidation and anticipatory breach
As noted earlier, Horton Rogers and Hazel Carty have both suggested a rather
different way in which existing contract doctrine putatively renders the tort of
two-party intimidation otiose. It concerns the anticipatory breach doctrine.
Carty’s version of the argument, it will be recalled, runs thus: ‘[t]he claimant
already has sufficient protection and remedies . . . [via] his contract rights –
including the right to sue for anticipatory breach – when the threat to break
the contract is made by the defendant’.111 However, such thinking is equally
106 ibid at [20].
107 (2002) 209 DLR (4th) 257.
108 See, eg, E. J. Weinrib, ‘Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies’ (2003) 78 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 55, 94 et seq.
109 For an account of this possible confusion, see J. Murphy, ‘The Nature and Domain of Aggravated
Damages’ (2010) 69 CLJ 353, 373–374.
110 See n 93 above.
111 Carty, n 13 above 119.
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vulnerable to the objection voiced earlier in connection with economic duress:
namely, that there is no a priori reason to suppose that the person threatened will
be in a contractual nexus with the person making the threat. Furthermore, even
if such a nexus does exist, the supposition that the anticipatory breach doctrine
can be invoked in lieu of two-party intimidation proves, under closer scrutiny, to
be entirely misguided.
Even if we suppose for the moment that Carty is right in thinking that it could
conceivably amount to anticipatory breach for A to threaten B that A will not
honour his side of the bargain at the due date for performance unless B does
something stipulated by A, there is again no reason to think that contract law acts
as a surrogate for tort. This is because, where a threat amounting to an antici-
patory breach is made, and the claimant seeks to accept that breach and sue for
damages in advance of the due date for performance, the claimant will not have
acceded to the threat.112 He will instead have acted in advance of the threat
coming to fruition. Yet for the tort action to be available, the claimant must
accede to the threat. He must be coerced into a course of conduct that he would
not otherwise choose for himself in order to avoid the threat coming to fruition.
Accordingly, upon analysis, it becomes clear that the two causes of action are
mutually exclusive. It is logically impossible for there to be any genuine prospect
of concurrence in such a circumstance even if a threat of the kind suggested
above had been made. But even here we may note a further rebuttal of Carty’s
suggestion.
In the example just given, we simply assumed that A’s threat of non-
performance unless B acted in a particular way could amount to anticipatory
breach. Yet, on closer inspection, this assumption turns out to be bogus. This is
because in a case of anticipatory breach, the ‘threat’ of non-performance will be
of a different order to the sort of threat required by the tort of intimidation. In
the latter context, the threat must be of the ‘or else’ variety. In a case of
anticipatory breach, by contrast, the kind of ‘threat’ in issue could better be
described as a bare declaration by the defendant that he no longer intends to
honour his side of an agreement. Put simply, although the talk in the context of
anticipatory breach may well commonly be of ‘threats not to perform on the due
date’, the reality is that the defendant will have issued, not so much a threat, but,
instead, a clear and unambiguous repudiation of the contract. As Devlin J put it
in Universal Cargo Carriers Corpn v Citati,113 ‘a renunciation can be made either by
words or conduct, provided it is clearly made’.114 And the test is ‘whether the party
repudiating has acted in such a way as to lead a reasonable person to the
conclusion that he does not intend to fulfil his part of the contract’.115
112 This is because, in essence, D has threatened to breach the contract and C has accepted the breach.
In intimidation cases, by contrast, C is usually forced into accepting something other than the
thing threatened. For example, if X threatens to break Y’s leg unless Y discontinues trading with
Z, Y will usually choose to avoid the broken leg – even though his choice will usually result in
serious financial repercussions – and elect instead to discontinue trading with Z.
113 [1957] 2 QB 401.
114 ibid, 436 (emphasis added).
115 ibid.
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The idea that any such unambiguous repudiation could contain a contingency
of the ‘or else’ variety is therefore obviously without foundation. This is partly
because, in cases of anticipatory breach, the claimant is left in no doubt as to what
course the defendant proposes to take. But it also because the defendant’s ‘threat’
to break the contract is not issued in terms that require the claimant to do
anything. As such, the key component of coercion, so central to the operation
of the tort of intimidation, is also necessarily absent. Accordingly, what we notice
is that, as a matter of logic, there can be no genuine scope for the anticipatory
breach doctrine to eclipse the tort of intimidation. Certainly, at the time of
writing, I could find not a single case of anticipatory breach in which the
defendant’s renunciation took the form of an ‘or else’ threat.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have endeavoured to illuminate the ingredients and nature of the
tort of intimidation. I have argued, in particular, that according to the most
defensible interpretation of the leading cases, as well as a matter of logic, unlawful
threats must be seen as possessing independent, normative significance; that they
cannot be equated simplistically with the acts actually threatened, nor confined
to threats to commit civil wrongs. I have also sought to show that, without first
accepting this interpretation, there can be no conceptual space for the three-
party version of the tort (irrespective of whether this is now best seen as having
been subsumed within the broader, unlawful means tort).
In addition, I have identified the fact that the overwhelming weight of
authority suggests that it is the wrongful coercion of the will, rather than the
infringement of some or other economic interest, that forms the gist of two-
party intimidation. The Godwin and Kolmar cases certainly illustrate this point;
while the early case of Gilbert v Stone – in which the threatened person’s life,
rather than his economic interests, were put at risk – lends further support to this
contention. The stringent requirement of genuine coercion in this tort also
serves to allay floodgate-type fears based on the idea that the tort of two-party
intimidation is liable to encourage certain people to submit too easily to relatively
insignificant threats and then seek redress.
Quite apart from the floodgates fear, there may well be those who would
simply baulk at the very idea that autonomy constitutes an individuated, pro-
tected interest within tort law. After all, it is perfectly true that autonomy is not
only a relatively vague idea, but also one which is seldom cited by the courts as
being the focus of their concern in tort cases. Nonetheless, to those who are
sceptical in this regard, I would simply point out that there is nothing especially
novel in my claim that infringements of autonomy may ground an action in tort.
Indeed, two examples – the tort of false imprisonment and the solatium award
in wrongful birth cases – have already been supplied. To these, two further
examples, drawn from quite separate areas of tort law, can also be given of
autonomy fulfilling just this role. In Chester v Afshar,116 the House of Lords
116 [2005] 1 AC 134.
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explicitly held that not giving a patient full information (and thereby denying her
an informed choice as to whether she should undergo an operation) was an
infringement of her autonomy and thus warranted an award of damages. Lord
Bingham noted that the rationale behind the duty to warn of dangers inherent
in medical procedures is ‘to enable adult patients of sound mind to make for
themselves decisions intimately affecting their own lives and bodies’.117 Equally,
a very similar principle can be seen to underscore the nascent law on misuse
of private information.118 In the leading case of Campbell v MGM,119 Baroness
Hale was openly vexed by an infringement of ‘the individual’s informational
autonomy’; while Lord Hoffmann was at pains to stress this tort’s role in
protecting ‘human autonomy and dignity’.120 What these various examples make
clear, then, is that although not a commonplace phenomenon, it is far from
unknown for existing tort law to respond openly and directly to wrongful
violations of free agency.
Furthermore, beyond these admittedly limited pockets of empirical support
for the claim that tort law is no stranger to the protection of autonomy, there is
a significant body of theoretical scholarship which suggests that tort law as a
whole can be understood in such terms. Arguably the most sophisticated such
argument belongs to Ernest Weinrib. For him, tort law is best understood in
terms of corrective justice; and the question of when correction is just is to be
answered by recourse to the principle of Kantain Right. Under this principle, the
tortious nature of one person’s conduct is determined by reference to whether
that freely chosen conduct is consistent with an equivalent freedom of choice in
others. As Weinrib puts it:
[b]ecause the parties to [a private law] . . . relationship are free wills, the [defendant’s]
action must be consistent with the freedom of the sufferer. Accordingly, the concept
of [Kantian] right constrains free and purposive action in the name of freedom
itself.121
Thus, even if the law of torts has still to work out the precise contents and
contours of the right to autonomy, there seems no good reason – in practice or
in theory – to doubt its being integral to the tort of two-party intimidation.
Two rather more radical propositions also follow from the observation just
made. The first is that the tort of two-party intimidation cannot properly be
regarded as one of the general economic torts. As Deakin and Randall have
observed, those torts are generally only concerned with the protection of ‘an
economic interest . . . in a trade, business, or employment which was the subject
117 ibid at [5]. See also, in similar vein, the speeches of Lords Hoffmann and Hope: ibid at [33] and [56],
respectively.
118 Whether the courts are wise to make such nebulous concepts the gist of tort actions is a moot
point; but it is not one that demands attention here since the present enterprise has been confined
to essaying a robust and defensible interpretation what of the courts have actually (wisely or not)
laid down as the chief ingredients and operational domain of the tort of intimidation in the leading
cases.
119 [2004] 2 AC 457.
120 ibid at [134] and [51], respectively.
121 Weinrib, n 57 above, 98.
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or target of the defendant’s action’.122 But as both Godwin and Kolmar amply
illustrate, it is simply the coercion of an individual that forms the gist of an
intimidation action. This in turn gives rise to the second radical contention:
namely, that, because two-party intimidation is not a specifically economic tort,
it was a most inappropriate tool for the House of Lords to have used in their
resuscitation of what they considered to be the exclusively economic tort of
unlawful means conspiracy in the Total Network case.123 Deploying two-party
intimidation to this end was rather like using a fork to eat soup.124
122 S. Deakin and J. Randall, ‘Rethinking the Economic Torts’ (2009) 72 MLR 519, 533–534. That
they describe these torts as being thus limited in their scope is referable to the fact that, in OBG,
Lord Hoffmann insisted that the unlawful means tort would require ‘a wrongful interference with
the actions of a third party in which the claimant has an economic interest and an intention thereby to
cause loss to the claimant’: n 10 above at [47] (emphasis added).
123 For explicit depiction of unlawful means conspiracy in this way, see n 20 above. Note also that
however illogical it may seem to confine this and the other so-called economic torts to economic
losses, the notion that they nonetheless deserve to be regarded in this way is one that receives
repeated endorsement in OBG.
124 This use of two-party intimidation in Total Network is most explicit in the opinions of Lord Mance
and Lord Neuberger. The former began by noting that Lord Hoffmann had made clear in OBG
that a case of two-party intimidation raised ‘altogether different issues’ than those at play in the
unlawful means tort. He then held that there was no need in Total Network to adopt the narrow
meaning of ‘unlawful means’ laid down in OBG since ‘there is . . . a distinction between the
infliction of harm through the intermediary of a third party (as in the tort of causing harm by
unlawful means under consideration in OBG v Allan) and the present situation where two
wrongdoers join and act together to inflict injury directly upon another person or body’: n 15
above at [124]. Lord Neuberger put things rather more pithily. ‘Lord Hoffmann made it clear that
his “discussion of unlawful means” was limited to cases involving “interference with the actions
of a third party in relation to the claimant” . . . [yet] [i]n this case, as Lord Hope and Lord Mance
have explained, the tort is of a two party nature’: ibid at [223].
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